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 Chapter 2 
 The Gene Ontology and the Meaning of Biological Function 
 Paul  D.  Thomas 
 Abstract 
 The Gene Ontology (GO) provides a framework and set of concepts for describing the functions of gene 
products from all organisms. It is specifi cally designed for supporting the computational representation of 
biological systems. A GO annotation is an association between a specifi c gene product and a GO concept, 
together making a statement pertinent to the function of that gene. However, the meaning of the term 
“function” is not as straightforward as it might seem, and has been discussed at length in both philosophi-
cal and biological circles. Here, I fi rst review these discussions. I then present an explicit formulation of the 
biological model that underlies the GO and annotations, and discuss how this model relates to the broader 
debates on the meaning of biological function. 
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1  What Is Biological Function? 
 The notion of function in biology has received a great deal of 
attention in the philosophical literature. At the broadest level, 
there are two schools of thought on how functions should be 
defi ned, now most commonly referred to as “causal role function” 
and “selected effect function.” Causal role function was fi rst pro-
posed by Cummins [ 1 ], and it focuses on describing function in 
terms of how a part contributes to some overall capacity of the 
system that contains the part. In this formulation, the function of 
an entity is relative to some system to which it contributes. For 
example, the statement “the function of the heart is to pump 
blood” has meaning only in the context of the larger circulatory 
system’s capacity to deliver nutrients and remove waste products 
from bodily tissues. However, one of the main objections to the 
causal role defi nition of function is that there is no systematic way 
to identify what the larger system (and the relevant capacity of that 
system) should be. Selected effect function, on the other hand, 
derives from the “etiological” defi nition of function fi rst proposed 
by Wright [ 2 ]. In this formulation, a function of an entity is the 
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ultimate answer to the question of why the entity exists at all. In 
biology, as explained by Millikan [ 3 ] and Neander [ 4 ], this is tan-
tamount to asking the following: For which of its effects was it 
selected during evolution? One obvious advantage of the selected 
effect defi nition is that it explicitly incorporates evolutionary con-
siderations, and demands that a function ultimately derive from its 
history of natural selection. On the more practical side, it has the 
further advantage of putting constraints on which effects, out of 
the myriad causal effects that a particular entity might have, could 
be considered as functions. Following the example above, an effect 
of the heart (beating) is to produce a sound, but it would not be 
correct to say that the function of the heart is to produce a sound. 
The selected effects defi nition of function would distinguish a 
proper function (e.g., pumping blood) from an “accidental” effect 
(e.g., producing a sound) on the basis that natural selection more 
likely operated on the heart’s effect of pumping blood. In the 
causal role defi nition, on the other hand, there is always the poten-
tial for arbitrariness and idiosyncrasy in defi ning a containing sys-
tem and capacities; thus there is no general rule for distinguishing 
functional from accidental effects. 
 Nevertheless, causal role function has been stalwartly defended 
by biologists in the subdiscipline of functional anatomy [ 5 ], which 
emphasizes how anatomical parts function as parts of larger sys-
tems. They claim that the selected trait can be diffi cult to infer, and 
lack of a hypothesis for such a trait should not stand in the way of 
an analysis of the mechanism of how an anatomical feature oper-
ates. For example, one could analyze a jaw in terms of its capacity 
for generating a crushing force irrespective of whether it was 
selected for crushing seeds or defending against a predator. Indeed, 
the search for mechanisms of operation, or more generally just 
“mechanism,” has more recently been offered as an alternative par-
adigm for molecular and neurobiology in particular [ 6 ]. Mechanism, 
like causal role, focuses on how parts contribute to a system. But it 
takes a step further in defi ning core concepts, and how these relate 
to function. The core concepts are entities and activities: physical 
entities (such as proteins) perform activities, or actions that can 
have causal effects on other activities. In this view, a function is 
simply an activity that is carried out as part of a larger mechanism. 
For example, the function of the ribosome (an entity) is translation 
(an activity), and translation plays a role in a larger mechanism of 
gene expression. The subtle difference from earlier formulations of 
function is an emphasis on  the activity having the role of a function , 
rather than  the entity itself having a function . Also like causal role, 
no a priori constraints are put on mechanism: “a function is … a 
component in some mechanism, that is … in a context that is taken 
to be important, vital, or otherwise signifi cant.” Clearly mechanism 
is susceptible to the same criticism as causal role function, regard-
ing arbitrariness in the choice of system. 
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 The core differences between selected effect function and causal 
role function derive largely from differences in what question they 
are trying to answer. For selected effect function, the question is 
about origins: Why is the entity there (i.e., what explains its selective 
advantage)? [ 2 ]. For causal role function, the question is about 
operation: How does the entity contribute to the biological capaci-
ties of the organism that has the entity (and only secondarily, how do 
those capacities relate to natural selection)? [ 1 ]. And there is little 
doubt that in most biological research endeavors today, the concern 
is in elucidating the mechanisms by which biological systems oper-
ate, rather than in explaining why the parts are there to begin with. 
 The notion of function, particularly in connection with molec-
ular biology, has been discussed at length not only by philosophers, 
but also by molecular biologists themselves. As a representative 
sample, I will consider two publications written with very different 
aims in mind: a textbook chapter by Alberts entitled “Protein 
Function” [ 7 ] and a philosophical treatise by Monod,  Chance and 
Necessity [ 8 ]. Alberts’ treatment of “function” covers two distinct 
but related senses of the word. The fi rst is how an individual pro-
tein  works at the mechanistic level (its manner of functioning): 
“how proteins bind to other selected molecules and how their 
activity depends on such binding.” The second is to describe how 
a protein acts as a component in a larger system, by analogy to 
mechanical parts in human-designed systems (its functional role in 
the context of the operation of the cell): “proteins … act as cata-
lysts, signal receptors, switches, motors, or tiny pumps.” Specifi c 
molecular binding can be considered the general mechanism by 
which a functional role can be carried out. These uses of “func-
tion” appear, at least on the face of it, to be more in line with the 
causal role and mechanism views in the philosophical literature. 
 Given its broader intended audience of scientists and laymen 
(and presumably philosophers),  Chance and Necessity puts biologi-
cal function in a much broader context. Monod coins the term 
“teleonomic function” to describe more precisely what he means 
by function. He carefully defi nes teleonomy as the characteristic of 
“objects endowed with a purpose or project, which at the same 
time they exhibit through their structure and carry out through 
their performances” [p. 9]. Teleonomy is also a property of human-
designed “artifacts,” further emphasizing the view of function in 
terms of an apparent purpose in accomplishing a predetermined 
aim. But living systems owe their teleonomy to a distinct source. 
As he so eloquently (if also compactly) states, “invariance necessar-
ily precedes teleonomy” [p. 23], which he goes on to explain fur-
ther as “the Darwinian idea that the initial appearance, evolution 
and steady refi nement of ever more intensely teleonomic structures 
are due to perturbations in a structure  which already possesses the 
property of invariance .” Thus what appears to be a future-goal-
oriented action by a living organism is, in fact, only a blind 
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repetition of a genetic program that evolved in the past. Importantly, 
Monod notes the presence of teleonomy at all levels of a biological 
system, from proteins (which he calls “the essential molecular 
agents of teleonomic performance”) to “systems providing large 
scale coordination of the organism’s performances … [such as] the 
endocrine and nervous systems” [p. 62]. In this way, Monod’s 
teleonomic function includes aspects of both Wright’s selected 
effect function (the origin of apparently designed functions in prior 
natural selection) and Cummins’s causal role function (the role of 
a part in a larger system). 
 In summary, function as conceived by molecular biologists (in 
what could be called the “molecular biology paradigm”) refers to 
specifi c, coordinated activities that have the appearance of having 
been designed for a purpose. That apparent purpose is their func-
tion. The appearance of design derives from natural selection, so 
many biologists now favor the use of the term “biological pro-
gram” to avoid connotations of intentional design. Following this 
convention, biological programs, when executed, perform a func-
tion; that is, they result in a particular, previously selected outcome 
or causal effect. Biological programs are nested modularly inside 
other, larger biological programs, so a protein can be said to have 
functions at multiple levels. The lowest level biological program is 
expression of a single macromolecule, e.g., a protein: the gene is 
transcribed into RNA, which is translated into a protein, which 
adopts a particular structure that performs its function simply by 
following physical laws that determine how it will interact with 
specifi c (i.e., a small number) of other distinct types of other 
molecular entities. At higher levels, the functions of multiple pro-
teins are executed in a coherent, controlled (“regulated”) manner 
to accomplish a larger function. Thus, simply identifying a coher-
ent, regulated system of activities can be a fruitful, practical start 
for identifying selected effect functions. Causal role analyses can 
and do play such a role in functional anatomy and molecular biol-
ogy. But of course they are only  candidates for evolved biological 
functions until they have been related to past survival and repro-
duction, the ultimate function of every biological program. 
2  Function in the Gene Ontology 
 I now turn to a description of how function is conceived of, and 
represented in practice, in the Gene Ontology. 
 In order to understand how gene function is represented in the 
GO, some basic molecular biology knowledge is required.
 –  A  gene is a contiguous region of DNA that encodes instruc-
tions for how the cell can make a large (“macro”) molecule 
(or potentially multiple different macromolecules). 
2.1  Gene Products, 




 –  A macromolecule is called a  gene product (as it is produced 
deterministically according to the instructions from a gene), 
and can be of two types, a  protein (the most common type) or 
a  noncoding RNA . 
 –  A gene product can act as a molecular machine; that is, it can 
perform a chemical action that we call an  activity . 
 –  Gene products from different genes can combine into a larger 
molecular machine, called a macromolecular  complex . 
 Each concept in the Gene Ontology relates to the activity of a 
gene product or complex, as these are the entities that carry out 
cellular processes. A gene encodes a gene product, so it can obvi-
ously be considered the ultimate source of these activities and pro-
cesses. But strictly speaking, a gene does not perform an activity 
itself. Thus, when the Gene Ontology refers to “gene function,” it 
is actually shorthand for “gene product function.” 
 The Gene Ontology defi nes the “universe” of possible functions a 
gene might have, but it makes no claims about the function of any 
particular gene. Those claims are, instead, captured as “GO anno-
tations.” A GO annotation is a statement about the function of a 
particular gene. But our biological knowledge is extremely incom-
plete. Accordingly, the GO annotation format is designed to cap-
ture partial, incomplete statements about gene function. A GO 
annotation typically associates only a single GO concept with a 
single gene. Together, these statements comprise a “snapshot” of 
current biological knowledge. Different pieces of knowledge 
regarding gene function may be established to different degrees, 
which is why each GO annotation always refers to the evidence 
upon which it is based. 
 The Gene Ontology (GO) considers three distinct aspects of 
how gene functions can be described:  molecular function ,  cellu-
lar component , and  biological process (note that throughout 
this chapter,  bold text will denote specifi c concepts, or classes, 
from the Gene Ontology). In order to understand what these 
aspects mean and how they relate to each other, it may be helpful 
to consider the biological model assumed in GO annotations. GO 
follows what could be called the “molecular biology paradigm,” as 
described in the previous section. In this representation, a gene 
encodes a gene product, and that gene product carries out a 
molecular- level process or activity ( molecular function ) in a spe-
cifi c location relative to the cell  ( cellular component ), and this 
molecular process contributes to a larger biological objective ( bio-
logical process ) comprised of multiple molecular-level processes. 
An example, elaborating on the example in the original GO paper 
[ 9 ], is shown in Fig.  1 .
2.2  Assertions 
About Functions 
of Particular Genes 
Are Made by “GO 
Annotations”
2.3  The Model 
of Gene Function 
Underlying the GO
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 To reiterate, GO concepts were designed to apply specifi cally 
to the actions of gene products, i.e.,  macromolecular machines 
comprising proteins, RNAs, and stable complexes thereof. In the 
GO representation, a region of DNA (e.g., a regulatory region) is 
treated not as carrying out a molecular process, but rather as an 
object that gene products can act upon in order to perform their 
specifi c activities. 
 In the GO, a  molecular function is a process that can be carried 
out by the action of a single macromolecular machine, via direct 
physical interactions with other molecular entities. Function in this 
sense denotes an action, or activity, that a gene product performs. 
These actions are described from the two distinct but related per-
spectives commonly employed by biologists: (1) biochemical activ-
ity, and (2) role as a component in a larger system/process. 
Biochemical activities include binding and catalytic activities, and 
are only functions in the broad sense, i.e., how something func-
tions, the molecular mechanism of operation. Component role 
descriptions, on the other hand, refer to roles in larger processes, 
and are sometimes described by analogy to a mechanical or electri-
cal system. For example, biologists may refer to a protein that func-
tions (acts) as a  receptor . This is because the activity is interpreted 
as receiving a signal, and converting that signal into another physi-
cochemical form. Unlike biochemical activities, these roles require 
some degree of  interpretation that includes knowledge of the larger 
system context in which the gene product acts. 
 A cellular component is a location, relative to cellular compart-
ments and structures, occupied by a macromolecular machine when 
it carries out a molecular function. There are two ways in which 
biologists describe locations of gene products: (1) relative to cellu-
lar structures (e.g.,  cytoplasmic side of plasma membrane ) or 
compartments (e.g.,  mitochondrion ), and (2) the stable 
2.4  Molecular 
Functions Defi ne 
Molecular Processes 
(Activities)
2.5  Cellular 




















 Fig. 1  DNA replication (in yeast) as modeled using the GO. Gene products/complexes ( white ) perform molecu-
lar processes ( molecular function ,  red ) in specifi c locations ( cellular component ,  yellow ), as part of larger 




macromolecular complexes of which they are parts (e.g., the  ribo-
some ). Unlike the other aspects of GO,  cellular component con-
cepts refer not to processes but rather a cellular anatomy. 
Nevertheless, they are designed to be applied to the actions of gene 
products and complexes: a GO annotation to a cellular compo-
nent provides information about where a molecular process may 
occur during a larger process. 
 In the GO, a  biological process represents a specifi c objective that 
the organism is genetically “programmed” to achieve. Each bio-
logical process is often described by its outcome or ending state, 
e.g., the biological process of  cell division results in the creation 
of two daughter cells (a divided cell) from a single parent cell. A 
biological process is accomplished by a particular set of molecular 
processes carried out by specifi c gene products, often in a highly 
regulated manner and in a particular temporal sequence. 
 An annotation of a particular gene product to a GO biological 
process concept should therefore have a clear interpretation: the 
gene product carries out a molecular process that plays an integral 
role in that biological program. But a gene product can affect a 
biological objective even if it does not act strictly within the process, 
and in these cases a GO annotation aims to specify that relationship 
insofar as it is known. First, a gene product can control when and 
where the program is executed; that is, it might  regulate the pro-
gram. In this case, the gene product acts outside of the program, 
and controls (directly or indirectly) the activity of one or more gene 
products that act within the program. Second, the gene product 
might act in another, separate biological program that is  required for 
the given program to occur. For instance, animal embryogenesis 
requires translation, though translation would not generally be con-
sidered to be part of the embryogenesis program. Thus, currently a 
given  biological process annotation could have any of these three 
meanings (namely a gene activity could be part of, regulate, or be 
upstream of but still necessary for, a biological process). The GO 
Consortium is currently exploring ways to  computationally repre-
sent these different meanings so they can be distinguished. 
 Biological process is the largest of the three ontology aspects in 
the GO, and also the most diverse. This refl ects the multiplicity of 
levels of biological organization at which genetically encoded pro-
grams can be identifi ed. Biological process concepts span the entire 
range of how biologists characterize biological systems. They can be 
as simple as a generic enzymatic process, e.g.,  protein phosphory-
lation , to molecular pathways such as  glycolysis or the  canonical 
Wnt signaling pathway , to complex programs like  embryo devel-
opment or  learning , and even including  reproduction , the ulti-
mate function of every evolutionarily retained gene. 
 Because of this diversity, in practice not all biological process 
classes actually represent coherent, regulated biological programs. 
2.6  Biological 
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In particular, GO biological process also includes molecular-level 
processes that cannot always be distinguished from molecular func-
tions. Taking the previous example, the process class  protein phos-
phorylation overlaps in meaning with the molecular activity class 
 protein kinase activity , as protein kinase activity is the enzymatic 
activity by which protein phosphorylation occurs. The main difference 
is that while a molecular function annotation has a precise semantics 
(e.g., the gene carries out protein kinase activity), the biological pro-
cess annotation does not (e.g., the gene either carries out, regulates, or 
is upstream of but necessary for a particular protein kinase activity). 
3  How Does the GO Relate to the Debate About the Meaning 
of Biological Function? 
 GO concepts are designed to describe aspects (molecular activity, 
location of the activity, and larger biological programs) of the  func-
tions that a gene evolved to perform , i.e., selected effect functions. 
However, GO concepts may not always be applied that way. As a 
result, a given GO annotation may or may not be a statement about 
selected effect function. Note that while all biological programs are 
carried out by molecular activities, not all molecular activities nec-
essarily contribute to a biological program. In principle, then, only 
those GO annotations that refer to biological programs can be 
considered to generally refl ect selected effect functions. 
 A GO  molecular function annotation by itself cannot be 
automatically interpreted as selected effect function. One of the 
most vigorous long-standing debates in the GO Consortium con-
cerns the  protein binding class in GO, as it is clearly appreciated 
by biologists that a given experimental observation of molecular 
binding may refl ect biological noise and not necessarily contribu-
tion to a biological objective. Even further removed,  cellular com-
ponent annotations are often made from observations of a protein 
in a particular compartment, irrespective of whether the protein 
performs a molecular activity in that location. For example, many 
proteins known to act extracellularly are also observed in the Golgi 
apparatus as they await traffi cking to the plasma membrane. In 
short, if the molecular activity and  cellular location are not yet 
implicated in a biological program (that is itself clearly related to 
survival and reproduction), they cannot be said to have selected 
effect function. Strictly speaking, such annotations should be con-
sidered as referring to  candidate functions, rather than  proper 
functions. 
 Despite these theoretical considerations, most GO annotations 
are likely in practice to refer to selected effect functions. This is 
simply because most GO annotations are made from publications 
describing specifi c, small-scale molecular biology studies that focus 
on a particular biological program. In such studies, a biological 
objective (usually implicitly related to survival and reproduction) 
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has already been established in advance, and the paper describes the 
mechanistic activities of gene products in accomplishing that bio-
logical objective. Large-scale studies, on the other hand, that mea-
sure gene product activities or locations without reference to the 
biological program they are part of, should be considered as  candi-
date selected effect functions. This view would address the recent 
debate about gene function [ 10 – 12 ], initiated when the ENCODE 
(Encyclopedia of DNA Elements) project—a large- scale, hypothe-
sis-free project to catalog biochemical activities across numerous 
regions of the human genome [ 13 ]—inappropriately claimed to 
have discovered proper functions. The GO Consortium is discuss-
ing ways to help users distinguish between hypothesis-driven anno-
tations (likely proper functions) from large-scale annotations 
(candidate functions). 
4  Conclusion 
 It has not generally been appreciated that the Gene Ontology con-
cepts for describing aspects of gene function assume a specifi c 
model of how gene products act to achieve biological objectives. 
My aim here has been to describe this model, which, I hope, will 
clarify how GO annotations should be properly used and inter-
preted, as well as how the GO relates to biological function as 
discussed in both the philosophical and biological literature. 
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